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MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW*
H. R. Stuart Ryan, Q.C.+
Nature of Relationship
Under the present law of Canada mental abnormality affects 
criminal law and its administration in the following ways:1
1. A person who is “ insane” when brought on for trial 
is regarded as unfit to stand trial and cannot be tried on a 
charge of a criminal offence.2
2. A person who is “ insane” as defined in section 16 of 
the Criminal Code is not criminally responsible for his conduct 
while he is in that condition. A person who acts in a state of 
unconscious automatism in a manner which would ordinarily 
be criminal may be treated as “ insane” within the meaning of 
section 16, or may be regarded as simply not having been 
engaged in voluntary conduct and therefore not guilty of a 
criminal offence.
3. A person who is not “ insane” but is “ mentally ab­
normal” may for that reason be incapable of the planning and 
deliberation required for guilt on a charge of capital murder, 
and perhaps incapable of forming the intent necessary for 
commission of other offences.3
4. A woman who by a wilful act or omission kills her 
newly born child while the “ balance of her mind is disturbed” 
as a result of giving birth or lactation is guilty not of murder 
or manslaughter but of infanticide.4
* A paper delivered at the Mid-Winter Meeting of the New Brunswick 
section of the Canadian Bar Association, held at Moncton, February 18, 
1967.
X H. R. Stuart Ryan, Q.C., B.A. (U. of T.) Osgoode Hall, of the Faculty 
of Law, Queen’s University.
1 See generally: Barry Swadron, Detention o f the Mentally Disordered 
(1964), cc. 8-12; G. A. Martin, "Insanity as a Defence” (1965-6), 8 Crim. 
L.Q. 240; J. LI. J. Edwards, “Automatism and Social Defence” (1965-6),
8 Crim. L.Q. 258; H. H. Bull, “Fitness to Stand Trial” (1966), 8 Crim. 
L.Q. 290, Report o f Royal Commission on the Law o f Insanity as a Defence 
in Criminal Cases (1956).
2 Criminal Code (1953-4), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51, ss. 524-6 (Can.).
3 More v. R., [1963] S.C.R. 522; 1 C.C.C. 289; 41 C.R. 98; see G. A. Martin, 
ibid., at p. 254, and “Necessity of Proof of Wrongful Intent in Criminal 
Cases” (1961), 4 Crim. L.Q. 63, at p. 67; Record 2nd Commonwealth & 
Empire Law Conference, 276; see also R. v. Lencltitsky, [1954] Crim. 
L.R. 216.
4 Criminal Code (1953-4), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51, ss. 204, 208.
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5. On a charge of murder, where provocation sufficient 
to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is 
supported by evidence, mental abnormality of the accused 
person is then to be taken into account in determining whether 
he was deprived of self-control.5
6. Mental abnormality of any kind is relevant to sentence 
when the court exercises discretion in awarding punishment.6 
For example, a mentally abnormal person placed on suspended 
sentence with or without probation may be required to undergo 
appropriate treatment.7 On the other hand, a “dangerous sexual 
offender” must in appropriate circumstances be sentenced to 
life imprisonment under the guise of preventive detention.8
7. A person found to be mentally ill or mentally deficient 
while in a prison may be detained by order of the Lieutenant- 
Governor, usually in a mental hospital.9
8. A person found to be mentally ill on receipt in a 
penitentiary may be rejected by the penitentiary authorities.10
5 Criminal Code, ibid., s. 203; Taylor v. R., [1947] S.C.R. 462; 89 C.C.C. 
209; 3 C.R. 475; the English rule appears to preclude such consideration; 
R. v. McCarthy (1954), 38 Cr. App. R. 74.
6 Criminal Code, ibid., s. 621; R. v. Bezeau, [1958] O.R. 617; 122 C.C.C. 35; 
R. v. Roberts, [1963] 1 O.R. 280; [1963], 1 C.C.C. 27; 36 D.L.R. (2d) 
696; 39 C.R. I.
7 Criminal Code, ibid., s. 638(2); cf. R. v. Jones, [1956] O.W.N. 396; 115
C.C.C. 723; 23 C.R. 364, and R. v. Kangles (1960), 129 C.C.C. 138, with 
R. v. Sheppard and Mitchell, [1966] 1 C.C.C. 230; for information con­
cerning the extent of use of probation under psychiatric treatment in 
Ontario see Annual Reports o f Forensic Clinic, Toronto Psychiatric Hospital, 
now Clark Institute of Psychiatry, U. of T., 1958-66, and Annual Reports 
Ontario Department o f Health, Mental Health Branch.
8 Criminal Code, ibid., ss. 659(b) and 661. This is a most unsatisfactory 
sentence. It is served in an ordinary penitentiary, usually a maximum 
security institution. The inmate is usually subjected to the ordinary peni­
tentiary regime, although a few have been kept in psychiatric wards or 
in segregation. Although parole is possible, it is life parole. At least two 
teen-age boys have been sentenced to this form of life imprisonment for 
indecent assaults on children. A number of, but not all, such offenders 
might be dealt with by an indeterminate “mental hospital” sentence 
recommended in this paper. The remainder should have determinate 
sentences.
9 Criminal Code, ibid., s. 527; see Re Brooks' Detention (1961), 38 W.W.R. 
51; and Swadron, Detention o f the Mentally Disordered (1964), pp. 332-7.
10 Penitentiary Act (1960-1), 9 & 10 Eliz. II, c. 53, s. 19(2) (Can.). A grotesque 
situation, which would have been funny if it had not been tragic, occurred 
some time ago in a western province. On refusal of an offender at a 
penitentiary, the provincial authorities at first refused to take him back, 
and he was for a time left literally at large on the street.
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9. By arrangement between the national and provincial 
governments inmates of penitentiaries may be transferred to 
mental hospitals for treatment during their imprisonment.11 
A similar transfer may occur where the inmate is in a provincial 
penal institution.12
10. The remand for observation of persons in custody 
pending trial or preliminary hearing,13 although intended to 
be a diagnostic measure for the information of the court, may 
lead to the accused’s being certified as mentally ill and detained 
in a mental hospital and removed from the criminal process. In 
some such cases, the criminal charge pending against the 
accused is not proceeded with.
Meaning of Terms
We refer to different mental conditions by the phrase “mental 
abnormality” in these several contexts. For example, our criminal 
law clings to the word “ insanity” which was long ago discarded 
as irrelevant and meaningless in medical science.14 The confusion 
is confounded because the word “ insane” is used in the Criminal 
Code in two quite different senses, one in relation to fitness to 
stand trial and the other in relation to immunity from criminal 
responsibility. As a test of fitness to stand trial, the issue is whether 
the accused is capable of understanding in some degree the charge 
against him and the nature and possible consequences of the pro­
ceedings and is able to “ instruct counsel” in the preparation and 
conduct of his defence.^ In reference to immunity from respons­
ibility, insanity is related by section 16 of the Code to incapacity 
to appreciate the nature and quality or the “wrongfulness” of 
conduct, resulting from either “ natural imbecility” or “disease of 
the mind” .16 The medical profession has pretty well abandoned 
the use of the term “ natural imbecility” but no confusion arises
11 Penitentiary Act, ibid., s. 19(1).
12 Criminal Code (1953-4), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51, s. 527; for reference to 
provincial legislation authorizing transfer see Swadron, Detention o f the 
Mentally Disordered (1964), pp. 428-435.
13 Criminal Code, ibid., ss. 451(c), 524(la) (as enacted by (1960-1), 9 & 10 
Eliz. II, c. 43, s. 22), 710(5): Fawcett v. Attorney-General o f Ontario,
[1964] S.C.R. 625; [1965] 2 C.C.C. 262; 45 D.L.R. (2d) 579; 44 C.R. 
201; Swadron, ibid., c. 8; cf. Ontario and Saskatchewan legislation cited 
in c. 8, pp. 262-9.
14 Criminal Code, ibid., ss. 16, 523-6; see, for example, Wily and Stallworthy, 
Mental Abnormality and the Law (1961), pp. 19-20; Whitlock, Criminal 
Responsibility and Mental Illness (1963), c. 1.
15 See H. H. Bull, “Fitness to Stand Trial” (1965-6), 8 Crim. L.Q. 290.
16 See G. A. Martin, “Insanity as a Defence” (1965-6). 8 Crim. L.O. 240.
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from its use. The phrase “disease of the mind” , on the other hand, 
has caused difficulty.17
“ Disease of the mind” corresponds roughly with the medical 
terms “mental disease” or “mental illness” , but medical classifica­
tion and terminology are not uniform. Medical concepts of mental 
abnormality, otherwise than in relation to mental defect, do not in 
any event correspond with either legal meaning of “ insanity” as 
used in our Code. The broad band of mental abnormality which 
is the special concern of the behavioural scientist includes condi­
tions some of which are and others which are not described generally 
as “ mental diseases” or “ mental illnesses” . There is, indeed, one 
school of psychiatrists who deny the existence of “ mental disease” 
as such.18 They substitute expressions such as “an altered internal 
status of the individual with relation to his external world as inter­
preted by others” . Although not generally accepted, their arguments 
are of value in emphasizing the fact that there is no clear line of 
distinction between mental illness and mental health.19
The following greatly simplified classification of mental ab­
normality appears to be generally accepted in medical science:20
1. States of greater or less mental defect or retardation, 
variously caused.21
2. “ Psychotic states” or “ psychoses” , in which the patient 
has an acquired state of mental abnormality by which the 
personality is markedly altered so that he loses his normal 
appreciation of reality and may become deluded or suffer 
hallucinations, and he therefore feels, thinks and behaves in
17 See, for example, Whitlock, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness
(1963), pp. 4-5, 27-32; Toch, Legal and Criminal Psychology (1961), pp. 
158-161; Roche, The Criminal Mind, c. 2.
18 Roche, in “Symposium on Criminal Responsibility and Mental Disease“, 
and Cavanaugh, in “A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision”, 
quoted by Burger J. in Blocker v. U.S. (1961), 288 F. 2d 853; Toch, ibid., 
p. 159; see also Szass, “Psychiatry Ethics and the Criminal Law” (1958),
58 Col. L.R. 183. Medical science prefers apparently to distinguish be­
tween a “disease”, which is a kind of entity with a reasonably definable 
cause and course, and an “illness” or “disorder” or “disability” which 
need not be so. For this reason the substitution of “disorder of the mind” 
for “disease of the mind” in Criminal Code (1953-4), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51 
(Can.) appears to be appropriate.
19 Whitlock, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness (1963), p. 75, Wily 
and Stallworthy, Mental Abnormality and the Law (1961), pp. 19 et seq.
20 See Wily and Stallworthy, ibid., pp. 26-7. There are many other similar 
classifications: see, for example, Katz, Goldstein and Dershowitz, Psycho­
analysis, Psychiatry and Law, pp. 506-521.
21 Wily and Stallworthy, ibid., c. 5.
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ways not normal to him. Some psychoses are organic or physical 
in origin.22 Others, described as “ functional” , where no evidence 
of related physical disorder is found, are apparently largely 
emotional in origin.23
3. Epilepsy includes a complex group of conditions 
resulting from a variety of causes, not necessarily accompanied 
by other mental abnormality. The patient may have any degree 
of intelligence; he may be a genius, like Julius Caesar.24
4. Neuroses are conditions in which the patient is dis­
turbed by psychic or physical symptoms which represent his 
emotional reaction to his problems and difficulties. Although 
they affect conduct, neuroses do not prevent normal apprecia­
tion or reality and generally normal social behaviour, and do 
not cause delusions or hallucinations.25
5. There are also various abnormal personalities, such as:
(a) The psychopathic or sociopathic personality, 
variously defined, but usually marked by consistent failure to 
display evidence of a normal conscience, and apparent inability 
to learn from experience or profit from instruction or punish­
ment. Psychopathy is often not accompanied by any other form 
of mental disorder.26
(b) Alcoholics or drug addicts who may but need not 
suffer from other mental disorder.27
(c) Sexual deviates, who likewise may but need not 
suffer from other mental disorder. Not all sexual offenders are 
deviates.28
(d) A woman suffering from the effects of childbirth 
or lactation may experience mental disorder, which may cause 
her to kill her child. I suggest that these tragic persons should 
not be convicted of any offence at all.29
In a sense, the phrase “disease of the mind” is irrelevant to 
medical science.30 All mental abnormalities call for treatment
22 Ibid., c. 6.
23 Ibid., c. 7.
24 Ibid., c. 9.
25 Ibid., c. 8.
26 Ibid., pp. 186-196.
27 Ibid., pp. 196-223.
28 Ibid., c. 11.
29 Criminal Code (1953-4), 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 51, s. 204 (Can.); Wily and Stall­
worthy, ibid., pp. 321-5.
30 Wily and Stallworthy, ibid., pp. 19-22.
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although some do not respond readily or at all to any treatment 
so far devised. Except for the distinction between mental abnormal­
ities of organic or of functional origin, it is impossible to find clearly 
defined boundaries marking off one kind of disorder from another.31 
The accepted classification of functional disorders is largely based 
on symptoms. One patient may display symptoms suggesting more 
than one category. The distinction between neuroses and psychoses 
may in certain cases be only a matter of degree and there may be 
differences of professional opinion over the correct classification.
Except for those who deny the existence of mental illness, 
psychiatrists generally agree that functional psychoses are “diseases 
of the mind.”32 Some but not all describe organic psychoses as 
“diseases of the brain” rather than “of the mind” because of their 
physical aspects. The courts now tend to regard them all as diseases 
of the mind.33 Epilepsy creates more difficulty in classification, 
because many epileptics do not exhibit symptoms of mental ab­
normality except while undergoing epileptic attacks, and some of 
them can keep their symptoms under control by diet and drugs 
while some others can obtain relief through surgery. Some psychia­
trists therefore describe epilepsy as a “disease of the brain” , but 
others classify it as a “disease of the mind” . As is no doubt well- 
known in this province, following the decision of the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal in the case of Marion O'Brien, the courts tend to 
regard epilepsy as a “disease of the mind” for the purposes of 
criminal law.34
Some psychiatrists in the United States regard “psychopathy” 
or “ sociopathy” as a disease of the mind, but others do not.35 In 
Canada, it is generally classified not as a disease but as a “person­
ality state” . Neuroses and personality states are not regarded as 
“diseases of the mind” in criminal law.36
31 MacNiven, “ Psychoses and Criminal Responsibility,” in Mental Ab­
normality and Crime, pp. 8-9.
32 See, for example, Lyles v. U.S. 254 F. 2d 725, evidence of Dr. Perretti.
33 C/., R. v. Charlson, [1955] 1 All E.R. 859; [1955] 1 W.L.R. 317; 39 Cr. 
App. R. 37, with R. v. Kemp, [1957] 1 Q.B. 399; [1956] 3 All E.R. 249; 
[1956] 3 W.L.R. 319; 40 Cr. App. R. 121. See Prevezer, “Defence of 
Automatism”, [1958] Crim. L.R. pp. 361, 443.
34 O'Brien v. R., [1966] 3 C.C.C. 288; see also R. v. Cottle, [1958] N.Z.L.R. 
999; Bratty v. A.G.N.I.., [1963] A.C. 386; [1961] 3 All E.R. 523; [1961]
3 W.L.R. 965; 46 Cr. App. R. 1; R. v. Dirto (1962), 38 W.W.R. 480; 
132 C.C.C. 198; 38 C.R. 32. See Leigh, “Automatism and Insanity” 
(1962), 5 Crim. L.Q. 160, and Beck, “Voluntary Conduct: Automatism, 
Insanity and Drunkenness” (1966-7), 9 Crim. L.Q. 315.
35 Cf. evidence of Dr. Perretti in Lyles v. U.S. 254 F. 2d 725 with that of 
Dr. Duval, mentioned in Blocker v. U.S. (1961), 288 2d 853.
36 See, for example, 8th Annual Report, Forensic Clinic, Toronto Psychiatric 
Hospital (1965), Appxs. viii and ix.
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Interpretation of Section 16, Criminal Code
The workings of the mind are so inter-related that when a 
person suffers from a mental disorder it affects all his mental func­
tions. A person who suffers from specific delusions, referred to in 
section 16(3) of the Code, cannot be medically regarded as “ in 
other respects sane” . This subsection therefore refers to a condition 
which is not recognized in medical science as existing in real life.37
The same difficulty confronts many medical men in attempting 
to relate the condition of any mentally abnormal person to the 
definition of insanity set out in section 16(2) of the Code. Some, 
however, manage to express themselves in the language of section 
16(2) on the hypothesis that they may with a good conscience 
describe severely psychotic persons as incapable of appreciating the 
nature and quality of conduct or of knowing that it is wrong. In 
Ontario, it seems, they may relate the word “wrong” to a moral 
as well as to a legal standard,38 but the Alberta courts appear to 
follow the English rule by which wrong means illegal and nothing 
more.39 The Canadian Royal Commission on Insanity as a Defence 
to Criminal Charges, in 1956, stated what I have described as the 
Ontario rule, and also professed to find in the word “appreciate” a 
greater requirement of understanding than could be extracted from 
the word “know” .40 I don’t think I can say that I “ know” the 
nature and quality of conduct unless I “appreciate” it in the manner 
defined by the Royal Commission. However, an interpretation 
similar to that of our Royal Commission was achieved in 1958 
by a Committee appointed by the Governor of New York.41 The 
New York Criminal Code, recently revised, contains a definition 
of insanity much like that in section 16 of our Code, with the quali­
37 There is widespread authority for this statement; see Lindman & McIntyre, 
The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1961), p. 338.
38 R. v. Lay cock, [1952] O.R. 908; 104 C.C.C. 274; 15 C.R. 292; R. v. O. 
(1959), 3 Crim. L.Q. 151; Report o f  Royal Commission on the Law o f  
Insanity as a Defence in Criminal Cases (Ottawa, 1956), p. 13; this inter­
pretation seems to be correct and will probably be upheld if the issue goes 
to the Supreme Court of Canada.
39 R. v. Cardinal (1953), 10 W.W.R. (N.S.) 403; 17 C.R. 373; R. v. Wolfson,
[1965] 3 C.C.C. 304; 46 C.R. 8; see R. v. Windle, [1952] 2 Q.B. 826; 
[1952] 2 All E.R. 1; 1 T.L.R. 1344; 36 Cr. App. R. 85. The Australian 
High Court has disapproved of the English rule in Stapleton v. The Queen, 
[1952] 86 C.L.R. 358.
40 Report of Royal Commission on the Law o f Insanity as a Defence in Criminal 
Cases (Ottawa, 1956), at pp. 11-12.
41 Interim Report o f Committee on Criminal Responsibility, May, 1958, 
pp. 301-2.
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fication that substantial rather than total incapacity is enough for 
a finding of insanity.42
Proposed Substituted Definitions of Insanity
I need not elaborate here the long campaign of attack on and 
defence of the so-called McNaghten Rules. I will merely mention 
several proposals for improvement of these rules that have been 
made.
The majority of the British Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment, 1949-53, recommended that the jury should be required 
to determine whether at the time of the act the accused was suffering 
from disease of the mind or mental deficiency to such a degree that 
he ought not to be held criminally responsible.43
The minority of that Commission would have continued the 
McNaghten Rules, with an extension to include cases where the 
actor is impelled by an “ irresistible impulse’’.44
The so-called “ Durham” rule, formulated by Judge Bazelon, 
in the United States Circuit Court of Appeal for the District of 
Columbia in 1954,45 asserted that if the unlawful act was the product 
of mental disease or defect the accused would not be criminally 
responsible. This test was almost identical with the test adopted 
in New Hampshire in 1870.46 One may note by way of irony that 
whereas the McNaghten Rules were not applied when McNaghten 
was acquitted, Durham was ultimately found guilty under the 
Durham Rule.47
The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code proposes that 
a person be not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
the conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks sub­
stantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, with a proviso 
that mental disease or defect does not for the purpose of determining
42 New York Penal Code, s. 1120, enacted by 1965, c. 593, s. 1, which 
provides: “A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the 
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequence of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong.”
43 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 Report, para. 790(19); 
see para. 333.
44 Ibid., Memorandum of dissent, pp. 285-7; see para. 317.
45 Durham v. U.S. (1954), 214 F. 2d 862.
46 State v. Pike (1870), 49 N.H. 399.
47 On his third trial. His second conviction was set aside: (1956), 237 F. 
2d 760.
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insanity include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal 
or other anti-social conduct.48
This test has been adopted in substance in several circuits of 
the United States Federal Court System49 and has been adopted 
by legislation in Vermont.50
Purposes of Criminal Law and Punishment
Before expressing my own views with respect to these rules 
and proposals, I would like to set out some features of the nature 
and purpose of criminal law and of punishment as I understand them.
We say that the purpose of criminal law and punishment of 
offenders is to protect society, but this means very little unless we 
show what it is against which we seek to be protected by criminal 
law and punishment, what protection we gain thereby and how 
this protection is given.
Criminal law and punishment of offenders together constitute 
an imperfect and inefficient instrument of social control, which 
embodies that part of the moral standards of our society, that we, 
acting through the state, have determined to be so vital to the 
continued existence and well-being of society that its rules and 
standards must be supported by publicly administered punitive 
sanctions, including the most severe sanctions which our society 
is willing to allow the state to impose. The motives that lead to 
the selection of different kinds of conduct for designation as criminal 
and the particular sanctions to be employed are diverse, but, no 
matter for what reasons any particular form of conduct is made 
criminal or any particular sanction is authorized, there is a moral 
judgment involved in the characterization of the conduct as so 
reprehensible that it is defined as a crime and the determination
48 Model Penal Code, Official Draft, 1964, Art. 4.01.
49 U.S. v. Freeman (1966), 357 F. 2d 606 (C.A., 2d Circuit). In the District 
of Columbia, the Durham rule was modified along similar lines in Mc­
Donald v. U.S. (1962), 312 F. 2d 847. See Pope v. U.S. (1967), 372 F. 2d 
710 (U.S. 8th Circuit) where a charge on the issue of insanity embracing 
and requiring positive conclusions by the jury as to defendant’s cognition, 
volition and capacity to control his behaviour, in which elements of 
knowledge, will and choice were emphasized as essential and critical 
elements of legal sanity, was held to be legally sufficient. The rules cur­
rently accepted in U.S. Circuit courts are summarized in an Appendix 
to the judgment of Blackmun J. at p. 737: “The U.S. Supreme Court 
has approved charges embracing McNaghten and irresistible impulse.”, 
per Blackmun J. at p. 734.
50 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, No. 4801 (1959). “Adequate” has been substituted 
for “substantial” capacity. Congenital and traumatic mental conditions 
are expressly included in “mental disease or defect.”
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that anybody who engages in it is an offender and ought to be 
punished by the state.
From cradle to grave, our moral education is conducted by 
praise and blame, reward and punishment. We learn to regard as 
laudable what is praised, particularly if it is rewarded. We learn 
to regard what is condemned as reprehensible and the more so 
if it is punished. One function of the criminal law therefore is its 
contribution to the acceptance by members of society of its generally 
accepted moral standards through condemnation and punishment 
of conduct defined as criminal. The moral aspect of criminal law, 
often expressed in part at least in terms of justice, which is a moral 
quality, has a bearing on the relation of the criminal law to mental 
abnormality.
Our criminal law and its administration must be consonant 
with the general moral sense of the community. Society will not in 
the long run tolerate and should not tolerate the condemnation 
as a criminal of a person who is generally regarded as morally 
innocent, or the condemnation or punishment of a person by a 
procedure which is generally regarded as morally inacceptable, or 
the imposition on him of a punishment that is generally regarded 
as morally unjustifiable. This is a very broad statement and its 
proper application to individual cases involves many complex 
moral judgments. What troubles many of us in our efforts to ap­
preciate the relationship between criminal law and morals is that 
we try too hard to simplify the moral issues involved. We tend to 
insist that the individual whose harmful conduct is under inquiry 
and would be criminal in normal circumstances be found either 
completely wicked and therefore guilty or completely innocent 
and therefore immune from criminal responsibility. The facts are 
seldom, if ever, simple enough for such a solution. Moral judg­
ments, if they are to be accurate, must take into account all relevant 
factors, however complex. Moral guilt is usually relative. This fact 
should be taken into consideration in our criminal law to a greater 
degree and more effectively than it is at present.
Our criminal law is founded on the hypothesis that most men 
are moral beings, capable of making choices based upon a measure 
of free will, responsible for their conduct and capable of under­
standing and accepting their responsibility. On the converse of 
this hypothesis is based the immunity from criminal responsibility 
of those persons whom we call insane. We consider it immoral and 
therefore unjust to condemn as criminals those who, by reason of 
mental defect or disease, cannot be treated as responsible persons. 
Leaving open for the moment the definition of insanity, I wish to 
emphasize at this point the moral foundation of immunity on 
that ground.
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Deterministic Theory
This hypothesis is constantly under challenge on the part of 
exponents of various schools of behavioural determinism, who 
advance evidence to support the conclusion that the concept of 
free will is largely if not entirely illusory, that man’s attitudes, 
his decisions and his conduct, are determined by his personality 
which is the combined product of his inherited qualities and his 
life experience.51 Behavioural scientists are able to show how certain 
events and influences mould personality and can distort it. Defective 
development of the conscience during childhood, over which the 
individual has little control, contributes to the making of the psycho­
path. Individuals with confirmed delinquent personalities have been 
identified below the age of eight years. Many of the influences 
having these effects are traced by these scientists back beyond the 
age at which memory commences. Some of them are found in the 
family relations of infancy. The attitudes and values of the individual 
are influenced by those of the group to which he belongs or of his 
“ reference group”, which means the group by whose standards he 
judges himself and others, whether or not he belongs to it. All 
education, particularly moral education, and all criminal and penal 
legislation and its administration, are based on the assumption 
that conduct can be determined. Our general theories of society 
are founded on this assumption.
From this evidence, several schools of criminologists have 
concluded that it is unreal and impractical to found criminal law 
and its administration on any theory of responsibility.52 It is argued 
that the sole purpose of criminal law is to prevent future socially 
harmful conduct, and this can be done best by avoiding moral 
judgments and by seeking simply to change attitudes and mould 
personalities through various forms of psychological and psycho­
therapeutic treatment of offenders, and through welfare and educa­
tional measures in society generally. One of the recent exponents 
of this theory is Lady Barbara Wootton, a prominent English 
sociologist, who set out her thoughts briefly in a series of lectures 
delivered under the Hamlyn Trust and published in 1963 under 
the title “Crime and the Criminal Law” .53 Her conclusion, like 
that of others of this school, is that there are only two questions,
51 All positivistic theory is, to the extent that it is consistent, based on this 
hypothesis.
52 “To found an institution, as eminently empirical and practical as a penal 
system should be, on a metaphysical soapbubble like the freedom of the 
will (imputability) can obviously no longer be done when once it is dis­
covered that the fundamental conception is not of this world.” : Olof 
Kinberg, Basic Problems o f Criminology (1935), p. 57.
53 Hamlyn Lecture Series, No. 15.
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namely, did the accused person commit the act or omission charged, 
and, if so, how is he to be treated in order to mould his personality 
and attitudes in order to ensure, as far as possible, that he will 
not do so again.54 The concept of responsibility is to be eliminated 
and conversely the concepts of immunity from responsibility and 
diminished responsibility on the ground of mental abnormality are 
to be discarded.55
On the face of it, there is a great deal of evidence to support 
this type of approach to criminal law and its enforcement. The 
effort to brush aside this type of attack on our traditional attitudes 
towards criminal law simply by saying that the law is concerned 
with responsibility and not with medical or psychological problems 
illustrates a refusal to deal adequately with the problems involved. 
It requires us to try to ignore the fact that the investigations of the 
deterministic schools have created a body of knowledge concerning 
the nature and causation of criminality which simply cannot be 
ignored by reasonable men.
Necessity of Concept of Responsibility
On the other hand, there is a paradox inherent in all deterministic 
theories, namely, that the healthy development of the personality 
requires a well-developed conscience, and the existence of this 
conscience in an individual and its full and healthy development 
require him to believe that he has the capacity to make moral 
judgments and to make moral decisions.56 In other words, whether 
or not his choices and his decisions and his conduct are prede­
termined, he must, in order to become a healthy, fully-developed 
person, believe that he can exercise free will and that he ought to 
make decisions based on moral judgments. Even if this belief is 
false, it appears to be necessary that it be held by the ordinary 
person with well-developed personality. Development of this belief 
seems to be essential also for successful psychotherapy in relation 
to mentally abnormal persons, who cannot be brought into a state 
of full mental health unless they can grasp and feel subjective 
responsibility for their own decisions and their own conduct.57 
This may seem to involve what might be called the “big lie”58 but
54 Ibid., pp. 32-57, 91-118.
55 Ibid., pp. 58-84.
56 Lewy, Responsibility, Free Will and Ego Psychology (1961), 42 Int. J. of 
Psychoanalysis, 267-8. Mower, Guilt in the Social Sciences, in Psychiatry 
and Responsibility (1962), pp. 38-67.
57 Katz, ‘‘Responsibility and Freedom” (1953), 5 Journal of Legal Education, 
274-5.
58 See Halper, “Existential Responsibility and Psychotherapy” (1965), Issues 
in Criminology (U. of Cal., Berkeley) 52, at p. 65.
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it seems rather to require rejection of the principle of absolute 
determinism and acceptance of a measure of choice and a degree 
of free will for most men.
Criticisms and Proposal
It seems to follow that the generally held belief that some, at 
least, mentally abnormal persons should be held criminally res­
ponsible for their conduct is well founded. In many cases, a judg­
ment that he is not responsible is harmful to the actor. It would 
seem to follow that the only persons who should not be criminally 
responsible are those whose mental abnormality is so great that 
they cannot grasp any substantial sense of responsibility with 
reference to objective reality. If this conclusion is correct, we must,
I think, reject the Durham Rule, since it would be wrong to exclude 
from criminal responsibility every person whose conduct is the 
product of mental disease or defect. This rejection would render 
irrelevant many severe criticisms of the Durham Rule based on 
the inability to identify causation and consequence in the relation­
ship between mental disease or defect, on the one hand, and conduct 
on the other,59 since we simply could not accept the Durham Rule 
and at the same time assert that some mentally ill or mentally 
defective person should be criminally responsible.
Ideally, the rule recommended by the majority of the British 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment sets out the purpose 
of any rule which is to define immunity on the ground of insanity, 
namely, to determine whether the actor is so mentally disordered 
that it would be unjust to hold him criminally responsible.60 How­
ever, the proposition seems to be too vague and indefinite for 
guidance of judges and juries in dealing with individuals.
The McNaghten Rules as originally stated, and even section 16 
of our Criminal Code, suffer from two defects. In the first place, 
the test is purely intellectual, and we have learned that you cannot 
isolate the intellectual aspect of mental disorder. In the second place, 
the rule is stated in an absolute form. It fails to take into account 
that there are persons who are capable of expressing in some fashion 
and, perhaps, in a very limited way, understanding the nature and 
quality of conduct or asserting in a kind of abstract form knowledge 
of the wrongfulness of conduct, but are so deeply defective mentally 
or are so seriously disordered that they are incapable of making
59 For criticisms, see Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the 
Law (1961), pp. 341-3; see also, Blocker v. U.S. (1961), 288 F. 2d 853, per 
Burger J.
60 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 Report, para. 790(19); 
see para. 333.
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choices and decisions and exercising control over their conduct in 
accordance with this understanding.61 The effort of the minority 
of the English Royal Commission, 1949-53, to overcome these 
problems by adding to the McNaghten Rules the exemption of 
those who act under the compulsion of an irresistible impulse is 
in line with many proposals of a similar nature made during the 
past century. Many psychiatrists, however, say they cannot de­
termine whether an impulse is irresistible or whether it has not been 
resisted. Others might argue that the fact that it has not been resisted 
proves that it was irresistible. These difficulties make the proposed 
rule difficult to employ.62
On balance, it seems to me that the best proposal is that of 
the American Law Institute.
This test is not perfect. In respect of the issue of inability to 
conform one’s conduct to the requirements of the law, it suffers 
to a degree from the same defect as the “ irresistible impulse” test, 
namely that one can never be quite sure whether the supposed 
inability to conform is merely failure to conform. The exclusion 
from the definition of mental disease or defect o f abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con­
duct is intended to guard against undue extension of immunity in 
this direction. The first part of the proposed rule is related to 
intellectual capacity to appreciate, but the word “ substantial” is 
intended to ensure that minimal capacity will not support criminal 
responsibility if there is substantial incapacity, and to recognize 
that deep emotional disorder may substantially impair overall 
capacity even though rudimentary intellectual capacity seems to 
be present.63
For these reasons, my colleague, Professor Stanley Beck, and
I, on being invited to express opinions before the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs on November 29th 
last, expressed a preference for the American Law Institute Rule 
over either the present rule or the Durham Rule.64 Andrew Brewin, 
Q.C., M.P., had introduced a bill which would substitute the Dur­
ham Rule for the present section 16, but when we stated our prefer­
ence he indicated that he would not oppose the adoption of the 
American Law Institute Rule.65
61 For criticisms of these rules, see Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally 
Disabled and the Law (1961), pp. 336-9.
62 For criticisms, see ibid., pp. 339-41.
63 For criticisms, see ibid., pp. 343-5.
64 House o f Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 
Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, No. 19, November 29, 1966, pp. 
657-672, 688-704. (Bill C-105).
65 Ibid., p. 655.
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However, both Professor Beck and I stressed before the Com­
mittee and I would emphasize here that, while it is necessary in 
accordance with our view of the proper scope of criminal law to 
have a rule asserting immunity from criminal responsibility on the 
ground of severe mental abnormality, defined as we have recom­
mended, only a very small minority of mentally abnormal persons 
should be immune from criminal responsibility and would be immune 
under any of the rules under consideration.
The Committee, I may say, rejected both Mr. Brewin’s proposal 
and ours, but recommended that in section 16 the phrase “disease 
of the mind” be replaced by “disorder of the mind” .66
Infrequency of Insanity Plea
One occasionally hears it said that in the District Columbia 
the number of acquittals on the ground of insanity has been reduced 
following the adoption of the Durham Rule. This information is 
not consistent with the statistics available to me, which indicate 
that during the years 1952 to 1954, in the District of Columbia, 
.30 per cent of persons found to have committed otherwise criminal 
acts were found not guilty by reason of insanity, while in the five 
years following adoption of the rule the percentage rose to 1.3 per 
cent.67 By way of comparison, the number of persons acquitted on 
the ground of insanity and detained as unfit to stand trial because 
of insanity in Canada, during the years 1960 to 1964 inclusive, 
taken together, amounted in all to less than .07 per cent of those 
otherwise found to have committed indictable offences.68 The small 
number of such persons so found in Canada reflects in part the 
Canadian attitude towards acquittal on the ground of insanity. The 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is seldom made except in 
defence to a capital charge, and when it is successful the person 
is usually treated as if he had “cheated the gallows” . He is generally 
regarded as having been convicted, and thece is a decision of an 
Ontario court to the effect that he is in the same position in relation 
to escape or rescue as a person serving a term of imprisonment.69 
The general policy of provincial governments has seemed to be 
based on the belief that he is a wicked person and should have 
been hanged and he cannot complain if he is incarcerated for the
66 Ibid., No. 27, 8th Report, February 28, 1967, pp. 950-1.
67 See Clayton, “Durham Rule Weighed after 5 Years in Use”, quoted in 
Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law, (1962). In Wily and 
Stallworthy, Mental Abnormality and the Law (1961), at p. 386, it is said 
that, apparently up to the end of 1960, out of 10,000 defendants charged 
in the District of Columbia since 1954, 90 had succeeded in an insanity 
plea, which would represent an average of .9%.
68 Statistics o f Criminal Other Offences, D.B.S., annual reports 1960-4.
69 R. v. Trapnel (1910), 22 O.L.R. 219; 17 C.C.C. 346; 22 D.L.R. 219.
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rest of his life.70 Many of us share that belief. It is little wonder 
that persons charged with other than capital offences and their 
counsel hesitate to plead not guilty by reason of insanity in answer 
to a non-capital charge although the finding is equally applicable 
to any criminal charge. Canadian practice requires us to believe 
that insanity as related to immunity is to be regarded as a defence 
and to be introduced in issue by the defendant, if at all,71 although,
70 For example, in R. v. Coleman (1927), 47 C.C.C. 148, the accused was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity and was detained by order of 
the Lieutenant-Governor in Halifax Jail, which nobody in his wildest 
dreams ever thought of describing as a therapeutic institution. It is re­
ported privately on good authority that in one province on one occasion 
an accused found “not guilty of murder by reason of insanity” was dis­
covered on admission to a mental hospital not to be “insane” or “mentally 
ill”. He had “put it across” the jury. The Lieutenant-Governor refused 
to release him, and as far as I could learn he is still in custody. See also 
Swadron, Detention o f the Mentally Disordered (1964), pp. 379-382. 
As Swadron mentions at pp. 386-7, procedures for release of persons 
so detained have been set up in Saskatchewan, Alberta and Ontario. 
Only in Saskatchewan is the procedure statutory and it has apparently 
disappointed the psychiatrists. The ad hoc arrangement in Ontario has 
released a few pathetic persons, one of whom had been in custody for
42 years and had apparently not been “insane” for a considerable number 
of years before his release, if at all. The Board of Review provided for 
Ontario Mental Hospital patients by (1966), 15 Eliz. II, c. 88, s. 1, does 
not yet apply to these detainees. A new Mental Hospital Act which will 
provide relief for them is promised but not in sight at the time of writing. 
As it is now, no patient can ask for review as of right anywhere in Canada. 
It was said by Dr. Rhodes Chalke in a public lecture on May 1, 1967, 
that in a recent survey he had found several persons, acquitted by reason 
of insanity, kept in provincial jails because provincial authorities refused 
to admit them to mental hospitals; one, acquitted on that ground by 
Court Martial, is kept in Stony Mountain Penitentiary, because no Mani­
toba provincial institution will receive him, notwithstanding protests 
from the Commissioner of Penitentiaries.
71 Except for an oblique reference in R. v. Keirstead (1918), 42 D.L.R. 193,
I have found no Canadian authority on this point. In answer to written 
inquiries directed to Attomey-Ger.eral’s Departments and the Depart­
ment of Justice in 1960, the replies I received were unanimous in stating 
the propositions herein set out. It is significant that both the Canadian 
Royal Commission on the Law o f Insanity as a Defence in Criminal Cases 
(1956), and Arthur Martin, “Insa:'.ty as a Defence” (1965-6), 8 Crim. 
L.Q. 240, refer to insanity as a “defence”. In England, Donovan J. held 
in R. v. Bastion, [1958] 1 All E.R. 568«; [1958] 1 W.L.R. 413: [1958] 
Crim. L.R. 391; 42 Cr. App. R. 75, that the Crown could raise the issue, 
but Lawton J. held in R. v. Price, [1962] 3 All E.R. 957; [1962] 3 W.L.R, 
1308; [1963] 47 Crim. App. R. 21, that only the defence could do so. 
See comments by Samuels, [1960] Crim. L.R. 453, approving of Bastian, 
and Macaulay, [1963] Crim. L.R. 817, approving of Price. Lord Denning, 
in Bratty v. A.G.N.I., [1963] A.C. 386, approved of Bastian, but got no 
support from the other Law Lords. It would seem to be illogical for the 
prosecution to seek a verdict of “not guilty” by reason of insanity, but 
we swallow many more illogical rules and practices.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 17
where the issue is unfitness to stand trial, either the Crown or the 
accused may raise the question. There is an exception to this rule 
with respect to the “defence of insanity” . Under recent decisions, 
such as Marion O'Brien's case,72 if the accused relies on automatism 
and the cause of the automatic conduct is related to epilepsy or a 
disease of the brain, the judge is required to put only the issue of 
insanity to the jury whether the accused wishes it to be done or not, 
and not to allow them to decide on the question of automatism 
unless there is evidence that there may also have been some other 
cause of the automatic conduct. Such cases, although spectacular, 
are not common. The Crown should be responsible for raising the 
issue of insanity or other mental abnormality in all appropriate 
cases. If neither party does so, the court should. Moreover, the 
accused should have a right to appeal from a finding on this issue. 
At present, the accused cannot appeal against an acquittal on the 
ground of insanity.73
Incidence of Mental Abnormality Among Offenders
Even if the Durham Rule were adopted, with the consequences 
that seem to have followed in the District of Columbia, at least 
98.7 per cent of persons found to have committed otherwise criminal 
acts would be criminally responsible. Nobody would deny that more 
than 1.3 per cent of offenders are mentally abnormal. The great 
majority consists of persons who are in the broad area of normality. 
Even the person of confirmed delinquent personality is normal 
within our accepted understanding of the term. Moreover, I do not 
assert that all mentally abnormal persons are mentally ill. Never­
theless, a substantial number of offenders are mentally abnormal 
and of this group a considerable number are mentally ill. Statistics 
in this area are lacking, but from information that I have gained 
concerning the population of penitentiaries in the Ontario region, 
it appears that more than 15 per cent of penitentiary inmates are 
in need of some form of psychiatric treatment. These are persons 
whose abnormality ranges from moderate to severe and they include 
a group which may amount to 4 per cent or more of the inmate 
population whose members are certifiable as mentally ill. Some of 
this last mentioned group are actually kept in provincial mental 
hospitals under treatment during the time required, in the judgment
72 [1966] 3 C.C.C. 288; see also footnote 34.
73 See comments by Swadron, Detention o f the Mentally Disordered (1964), 
pp. 367-376.
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of the hospital staff, for treatment. The remainder are kept in 
maximum security penitentiaries in what are euphemistically called 
psychiatric wards, or else in solitary confinement in what inmates 
graphically call “ the hole” .74
If one may judge from statistics published by the Ontario De­
partment of Health, perhaps 900 to 1,000 persons who came before 
the criminal courts in Canada in 1963 and who either had or might 
have committed otherwise criminal acts were mentally ill to such 
an extent as to be certifiable under provincial legislation, which 
requires that the patient be not only mentally ill but also in a condi­
tion which requires his being kept in custody for his own protection 
or that of others.75 They suggest also that a number of other accused 
persons, perhaps 4,000 to 4,500 of them, were sufficiently mentally 
abnormal that they were or should have been referred to psychiatrists 
for diagnosis and a considerable number of those would require 
psychiatric treatment.
I think that I can say categorically that our maximum and 
medium security penitentiaries and most provincial penal insti­
tutions rank high in unsuitability for treatment of most inmates
74 This information has been gained largely through personal contact with 
members of penitentiary staffs and some contact with inmates over the 
past nine years. Some idea of the nature and extent of the problem can 
be gained from the evidence of Drs. George D. Scott and R. J. McCaldon, 
Penitentiary Staff Psychiatrists in the Ontario region, in Proceedings o f the 
Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Penitentiaries, No. 4, Feb. 2, 
1967, pp. 148-73, and No. 8, March 3, 1967, pp. 299-315. In the Report 
of the Commissioner o f Penitentiaries for the Year ending March 31, 1965, 
p. 29, it was said that about a third of inmates made use of psychiatric 
services; before staff psychiatrists were appointed 1 in 17 inmates would 
be committed to provincial institutions but the ratio had been reduced 
to 1 in 80. From the doctors’ evidence it appears that a considerable 
number of inmate interviews with psychiatrists are part of the endless 
effort towards “manipulation of staff” constantly exerted by many inmates. 
Not all the one-third of inmates reported by the Commissioner are neces­
sarily mentally disordered. I am informed that on May 1, 1967, there 
was in Kingston Penitentiary 179 inmates diagnosed as psychotics; the 
“psychiatric ward” houses about 45 of them.
75 Report o f Mental Health Branch, Table 17. — Admissions: Sec. 35, Mental 
Hospitals Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 236 by Lt. Governor’s Warrant, 66: 
Sec. 38, order of Magistrate, 762, of which 235 certificated, 4 remained 
as voluntary patients; in all 828, of whom 305 certifiable. In 1965, 189 
patients were referred to Forensic Clinic, Toronto Psychiatric Hospital 
by courts and probation officers. In 1964, 808 patients were referred to 
other outpatient clinics by courts, probation officers and police.
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who require psychiatric treatment, whether they are certifiable or 
not.76
At this point, I return to my proposition that, although a 
considerable number of mentally abnormal and even mentally ill 
persons ought to be found criminally responsible for conduct other­
wise criminal, we ought to realize that moral and therefore criminal 
responsibility can be relative. Moral and criminal judgments should 
take into account the mental abnormality of the actor whose conduct 
is being judged. We have no justification for saying that the mentally 
ill person is mentally ill because he wishes to be or even that the 
psychopath is what he is from choice. Gradations in responsibility 
should be reflected in punishment, which should be selected and 
administered, as far as possible, with a view to ensuring that the 
offender will not offend again, and that if, by reason of his ten­
dencies, he poses a serious threat to society he should be kept in 
custody or under control while being treated in such a matter as 
to overcome his criminal proclivities. Prolonged custody can be 
justified only for that reason.
English Mental Health Act, 1959, and Scottish Counterpart
These considerations lead me to suggest that we could in 
Canada gain by following the examples of England and Scotland, 
as set out in the English Mental Health Act, 1959,77 and similar 
legislation of the following year applicable to Scotland.78
Under this legislation, where a person is convicted of an offence 
punishable with imprisonment, where the punishment is not fixed 
by law, and the court is satisfied on the written or oral evidence
76 See evidence of Drs. Scott and McCaldon, in Proceedings o f the Special 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on Penitentiaries, No. 4, Feb. 2, 1967, 
pp. 299-315, particularly Dr. Scott, at pp. 153-4, and Dr. McCaldon 
at pp. 300-1; see also O’Connor, “ Impressions Concerning Adaptation to 
Imprisonment,” in Proceedings, Canadian Congress o f Corrections, 1957, 
110, and Cormier, “The Psychological Effects of the Deprivation of Liberty 
on the Offender,” ibid. ; 137. Fomataro, Canadian Prisons To-day, in Crime 
and its Treatment in Canada (1965), pp. 316, 321. Private communica­
tions from Dr. Barry Boyd, Superintendent, Ontario Hospital, Pene- 
tanguishene, tend to confirm this proposition. For example, in Ontario, 
male sexual deviates and narcotic addicts are confined in a shiny but 
oppressive super-maximum security prison along with the hostile-aggressive 
inmates for whom the prison was designed.
77 7 & 8 Eliz. II, c. 72, Part V, ss. 60-71, particularly ss. 60-1, 65.
78 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 61.
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of two medical practitioners that the offender is suffering from 
mental illness or psychopathic disorder or mental defect, and that 
the mental disorder warrants the detention of the patient in a 
mental hospital for medical treatment or out-patient treatment 
under supervision, and the court is of the opinion, having regard 
to all the circumstances including the nature of the offence and 
the character and history of the offender, and to the other available 
methods of dealing with him, that the most suitable method of 
disposing of the case is by such treatment, the court may authorize 
the detention of the offender for treatment in a mental hospital 
or place him under the guardianship of a local health authority 
or approved person for outpatient treatment. Such an order for 
admission to a mental hospital is not to be made unless arrange­
ments have been made for the admission of the offender to that 
hospital within a short time and no order for guardianship is to 
be made unless the local health authority or person named is willing 
to receive the offender into guardianship. When such an order is 
made, no fine and no term of imprisonment may be added, but 
any other order which the court may make may also be made. 
Somewhat similar powers are given to courts dealing with children 
and young persons'. Where the offence is summary a hospital or 
guardianship order may be made without conviction. In making 
the hospital order, the court may, if it appears desirable, impose 
restrictions on the release of the offender either indefinitely or for 
a fixed time. Subject to such an order, the period of treatment is 
indeterminate. The time of discharge from hospital is determined 
primarily by the staff of the hospital, but the patient may apply 
from year to year for his release to a board called The Mental 
Health Review Tribunal. Where restrictions on discharge have been 
imposed by the court, they may be removed by the Secretary of 
State who may authorize discharge conditionally or absolutely. 
Under another statute,79 courts are authorized to impose a condi­
tion of probation that the offender submit for a period not exceed­
ing twelve months to appropriate treatment, in or out of hospital, 
for mental disorder. Power to transfer inmates of prisons to hospitals 
and to detain during pleasure of the Crown persons found unfit to 
stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity is continued.
Studies of the working of this legislation up to the end of 1962 
have been published, and they suggest that it is working very well.80
79 Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 58, ss. 3 & 4.
80 McCabe, Rollin and Walker, “The Offender and the Mental Health Act”
(1964), 4 Medicine, Science and the Law, 231.
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In 1962, 2,171 persons found to be mentally abnormal were disposed 
of as follows:81
Transferred from prison to hospitals before trial 
and sentence 5
Placed on probation with requirement of outpatient 
treatment 380
Placed on probation with requirement of inpatient 
treatment 456
Placed on guardianship under the Mental Health Act 14 
Subjected to hospital order without conviction 
(summary offence) 52
Placed under hospital order after conviction without 
restriction order 892
Placed on similar order with restriction 136
Found insane and unfit to stand trial 36
Found guilty but insane (now not guilty by reason 
of insanity) 9
Found of diminished responsibility under the Homi­
cide Act 1957, (a verdict available only on a charge 
of murder and resulting in a conviction of 
manslaughter) 34
Found guilty of infanticide 17
Transferred from prison to hospital during sentence 140
TOTAL 2,171
The courts regard their discretion as important and in a number 
of cases have refused to make hospital orders because they are not 
satisfied with the degree of security in the regime of the hospitals 
concerned, or for some other reason.82
The British system seems to be superior to our own, since a 
remand for observation under section 451(c) or 524(la) or 710(5) 
of the Criminal Code does not dispose of the charge if the accused 
is certified and retained in the institution and, as we have seen in 
the Fawcelt case,83 either injustice or an appearance of injustice 
may result. The accused may have the charge hanging over his 
head for the rest of his life, and it may never be determined whether 
he in fact committed the act or omission which was the cause of
81 Ibid., p. 235.
82 Walker, “The Mentally Abnormal Offender in the English Penal System”
(1965), The Sociological Review, Monograph, No. 9, Sociological Studies 
in the British Penal Services, 133; Thomas “Sentencing the Mentally 
Disturbed Offender”, [1965] Crim. L.R. 685.
83 Fawcett v. Attorney-General o f Ontario, [1964] S.C.R. 625; [1965] 2 C.C.C. 
262; 45 D.L.R. (2d) 579; 44 C.R. 201.
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his being brought before the court. Moreover, if the accused is 
returned to the court from such a remand, the court, as in the 
case of Robin Roberts,84 is not always informed fully of his condi­
tion, although it may be very important when the time for sentencing 
comes around that a full report be available. A number of psychia­
trists have said that they fear to submit a full report on return of 
the accused before trial since the information it contains may 
apparently involve a confession of guilt.85 Finally, if the accused 
is not certifiable under provincial legislation and is not suitable 
for probation, our present law seems to offer no alternative to 
ordinary imprisonment which may be quite inappropriate.
Possible Application in Canadian Penal System
The scheme of the Mental Health Act seems preferable to the 
introduction of the Scottish and English defence of diminished 
responsibility,86 since that defence is specifically confined, in England 
at any rate, to a charge of murder and, as the Canadian Royal 
Commission on Insanity observed in 1956,87 the result is merely 
the substitution of a conviction for manslaughter instead of one 
for murder, and the accused would under our present law be sen­
tenced to imprisonment in the ordinary way. In Canada, such an 
accused would probably not be convicted of capital murder, if his 
mental condition justified a finding of diminished responsibility, so 
that the only result would be that, instead of a mandatory life 
imprisonment for non-capital murder, he would be subject to a 
term of imprisonment fixed by the court which might be for life. 
Treatment in therapeutic institutions would appear to be most 
appropriate for many such offenders. Under the scheme of the 
English Mental Health Act, the court may recognize diminished 
responsibility in any case, and, where it seems appropriate, sub­
stitute an indeterminate period o f treatment either in or out of 
custody for a period of imprisonment.88 The discretion given to
84 R. v. Roberts, [1963] 1 O.R. 280; [1963] C.C.C. 27; 36 D.L.R. (2d) 696;
39 C.R. 1.
85 See evidence of Dr. Barry Boyd, House o f Commons Committee on Justice 
and Legal Matters, Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, No. 9, July 7, 
199, pp. 234-5 (Bill C-176).
86 This defence, reducing murder to culpable homicide (manslaughter), was 
introduced into Scots law by judicial creation, H.M. Advocate v. Dingwall 
(1867), 5 Irv. 466, and into English Law by the Homicide Act, 1957, 
5-6 Eliz. II, c. 11, s. 2.
87 Report o f  the Royal Commission on the Law o f Insanity as a Defence in 
Criminal Cases, pp. 66-7.
88 See McCabe, Rollin and Walker, “The Offender and the Mental Health 
Act” (1964), 4 Medicine, Science and the Law, 231, at pp. 236-7; and 
Thomas, “Sentencing the Mentally Disturbed Offender”, [1965] Crim. 
L.R. 685, at p. 686, n 1.
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the court is important, since some mentally abnormal persons will 
respond about as well to treatment in prison as to treatment in a 
mental hospital. Others should be confined in a mental hospital 
for treatment, while still others can be treated out of custody. It 
seems preferable, where it can be determined that psychotherapy 
in a therepeutic institution is indicated, to provide for such treat­
ment of an offender in the sentence, rather than to commit the 
offender for a term to a penal institution. In the first place, the 
regime at a penal institution is basically and intentionally degrading, 
and degradation is likely to be more harmful than beneficial to 
the inmate and to hinder his cure if he is mentally abnormal. 
Secondly, the atmosphere in a penal institution tends to be one of 
hostility, that is to say, “we”, the inmate population, tend to be 
at war with “ they” , the administration and all those related to 
it.89 In the third place, in maximum and even medium security 
penal institutions, considerations of custody and administration 
come first, and considerations of treatment lag far behind. Even 
in minimum security institutions, treatment does not receive first 
priority. Finally, the offender sentenced to imprisonment is usually 
sentenced to a term which has no relation to the period of treatment 
required. If removed from prison to a mental hospital for treat­
ment, then, on completion of treatment, he may come back to the 
penal institution to complete a term which is no longer necessary 
for him, and which may undo whatever good has been done by 
the psychotherapeutic treatment. Mentally disordered prisoners 
often improve greatly in condition on being transferred even to 
maximum security mental hospitals but regress severely on being 
sent back to prison.
Fear of undue haste by hospital authorities in releasing a 
dangerous offender may be overcome by a restriction on release 
imposed by the judge as part of the sentence.90
I do not wish to be thought of as a Pollyanna. I am well aware 
that the recognition of a mental abnormality is far easier than the 
determination of its cause, and that diagnosis is far easier than cure. 
Some forms of mental abnormality cannot be treated in the present 
state of medical science and in these cases there is no course open 
except segregation in custody. This is particularly true where the 
cause is degenerative change of an organic nature. Psychopathy, 
in many manifestations, is highly resistant to treatment of any
89 See evidence of Dr. Scott in Proceedings o f  the Special Joint Committee 
on Penitentiaries, No. 4, Feb. 2, 1967, pp. 148-73, and Fomataro, “Can­
adian Prisons To-day” in Crime and Its Treatment in Canada (1965), 
pp. 306-7.
90 Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. II, c. 72, s. 65.
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kind.91 Apparent cures of mental disorder are often only condi­
tional and relapses are frequent. Admitting all these adverse factors, 
I think that the balance is still in favour of psychotherapeutic 
treatment where it is indicated as preferable on diagnosis.
How would this reform be carried out? In Canada, mental 
hospitals are now entirely within provincial jurisdiction,92 while 
penal institutions are divided between national and provincial 
administration.93 Probation is exclusively a provincial affair.94 How­
ever, the criminal law is within the national legislative jurisdiction 
and the power of Parliament to enact criminal law undoubtedly 
includes power to prescribe procedure and sanctions in the widest 
sense.95 Clearly Parliament can enact a provision for sentencing 
similar to that in the English Mental Health Act, 1959. The problem 
is by whom and where facilities for treatment ought to be provided.
At the present time, a measure of psychiatric treatment is pro­
vided in all penal institutions. In testifying recently before the 
Senate-House special Joint Committee on Penitentiaries, Dr. George 
D. Scott, of Kingston, the staff psychiatrist for the Ontario Region 
of the Penitentiary Service, commented on the inadequacy of existing 
facilities in that region. Even taking into account available maximum 
security space in the Ontario Hospital system, the needs of difficult 
cases cannot be provided for, and the accommodation at Kingston 
Penitentiary is inadequate and unsatisfactory. Only the inmates of 
the Prison for Women seem to receive adequate attention in his 
opinion.96 As one having some slight familiarity with that institution 
I may express serious doubt whether even they are adequately 
provided for. I am informed that conditions are no better in other 
regions of the penitentiary system.
Provision is being made for construction of medico-psychiatric 
units in each penitentiary region.97 These centres are to be welcomed.
91 Wily and Stallworthy, Mental Abnormality and the Law (1961), p. 195; 
but see p. 192 where it is said that there is a strong tendency for psychopaths 
to mellow with the passage of time.
92 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, s. 92(7).
93 Ibid., ss. 91(28) “penitentiaries”, 92(6) “public and reformatory prisons” .
94 There is no constitutional reason why a national probation service could 
not be created.
95 See Johnson v. A.G. Alta., [1954] S.C.R. 127; [1954] 2 D.L.R. (2d) 625; 
108 C.C.C. 1; 18 C.R. 21, and R. v. Superior Publishers et al., [1954] 
O.R. 981; 110 C.C.C. 115; 20 C.R. 51; R. v. Neil (1957), 119 C.C.C. 1,
11 D.L.R. (2d) 545; 26 C.R. 281.
96 See footnote 74. Drs. Scott and McCaldon deserve great credit for their 
work and no doubt other staff psychiatrists are equally devoted.
97 Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Penitentiaries, Proceedings, 
Evidence of A. J. MacLeod, Commissioner of Penitentiaries, No. 2, 
January 24, 1967, 49.
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It is to be hoped that they will be given priority over the proposed 
new maximum and super-maximum bastilles now planned and 
that their introduction will be accompanied by increases in thera­
peutic staffs. However, as in all professional fields, there are shortages 
of qualified personnel. Salaries and conditions o f work must be 
improved if professional and sub-professional staffs are to be 
enlisted in adequate numbers. In my opinion these institutions will 
not solve the problems 1 have outlined, although they will ameliorate 
conditions in penitentiaries.
Basically, the situation is similar in most provincial institutions.
My suggestion is that agreements be made between the national 
and provincial governments to provide for accommodation and 
treatment, both as inpatients in mental hospitals and clinics and as 
outpatients, of those offenders who are found by the courts to be 
appropriate subjects for orders under an equivalent of the Mental 
Health Act, 1959. These steps will take time, because institutions 
cannot be built overnight, but they can be built more quickly than 
staffs can be trained. Recent trends towards increased outpatient 
treatment of mentally abnormal persons should help to reduce 
overcrowding in provincial mental hospitals. I would suggest that 
aggressive measures be taken, at both levels, national and prov­
incial, with a view to making adequate provision for these cases.
Possible Implications
Such a step would create several major problems of principle. 
The first, is whether insanity as a defence to criminal charges should 
be eliminated. It has been urged by some British thinkers98 that 
this defence is, if not obsolete, at least obsolescent there. Only 
9 persons were found not guilty by reason of insanity in England 
in 1962.99 If I am correct, recognition of the principle of respons­
ibility requires us to retain the defence, although it may not be 
often raised.
A similar problem arises with regard to capacity to stand trial. 
It would seem to be desirable to have in every case a judicial de­
termination whether the accused person was a party to the conduct 
which is alleged to have been criminal. The rule preventing trial 
of such persons was developed when they could not have counsel 
or any assistance at trial and no witnesses could be called on their 
behalf. The issue whether the accused did the act can now be tried 
where it is alleged that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity.
98 Barbara Wootton, Hamlyn Lecture Series, No. 15; Nigel Walker, Crime 
and Punishment in Britain (1964), p. 293.
99 McCabe, Rollins and Walker, “The Offender and the Mental Health Act” 
(1964), 4 Medicine, Science and the Law, 231.
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It seems possible to try it even though the accused is incapable of 
appreciating the nature of the charge and of the proceedings, since 
he can now be represented by counsel who may be given complete 
facilities for preparation and conduct of the defence, except insofar 
as the accused is incapable of instructing him.100 Moreover, if the 
Podola case101 is correctly decided, or if we consider it proper to 
try persons who are suffering from complete amnesia, arising from 
any cause, with relation to the time of the conduct in question, 
there does not seem to be any difficulty in having the issue of com­
mission of the alleged conduct tried even though the accused is 
incapable of understanding what it is all about. If so, the accused 
may be found not guilty if he did not do the act, or, if he did, not 
guilty by reason of insanity or he may be made the subject of an 
order under the equivalent of the English Mental Health Act, 1959. 
If I am correct, the issue of fitness to stand trial, should not arise. 
The House of Commons Committee on the Administration of 
Justice has recommended that introduction of the issue of fitness 
to stand trial might be postponed until after completion of the 
case for the Crown, and that if no case were made out the accused 
could be simply acquitted.102 Although an improvement over the 
present arrangement, this proposal seems inferior to my own.
The third question relates to the issue of automatism. Under 
the doctrine of the O'Brien case,103 if the defence is automatism, 
and if the cause of the automatism is apparently either disease of 
the mind or disease of the brain, the issue must be one of insanity, 
whereas if the cause of the automatism is apparently injury or a 
drug or somnambulism, and so on, the issue is simply one of volun­
tary conduct or no voluntary conduct. If there is no voluntary 
conduct the accused is simply acquitted. Logically, the issue should 
be the same in each case, since if the conduct is automatic there 
can be no voluntary conduct which can be the subject of insane 
volition, whether the automatism is caused by disease or organic 
condition or any other cause, but pragmatically there is some 
justification for the O'Brien type of decision, provided that a finding 
of not guilty by reason of insanity is not necessarily followed by
100 See evidence of Dr. Boyd, House o f  Commons Committee on Justice and 
Legal Matters, Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, No. 9, July 7, 1966, 
pp. 234-5 (Bill C-176), and discussion by Swadron, Detention o f the 
Mentally Disordered (1964), pp. 322-5.
101 R. v. Podola, [1960] 1 Q.B. 325; [1959] 3 All E.R. 418; [1959] 3 W.L.R. 
718; 43 Cr. App. R. 220.
102 House o f  Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 
Minutes o f Proceedings and Evidence, No. 27, 8th Report, February 28, 
1967, pp. 949-50.
103 [1966] 3 C.C.C. 288.
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incarceration for life or an unduly prolonged time in a maximum 
security mental hospital.104 It seems unjust that an epileptic who 
may be capable of living a useful and valuable life in society under 
a controlled regime, and subject to supervision, if necessary, should 
be incarcerated either in a mental hospital or in a prison. What we 
need is some rational disposition of the case following the finding. 
It might be feasible to combine several recent proposals and to 
authorize a verdict of not guilty by reason of automatism coupled 
with provision for treatment. The employment of probation orders 
without conviction has been discussed, and this might be a good 
case for their use. The proper disposition of a case of automatism 
should be casuistic. We should not allow ourselves to become 
enmeshed, as we have been, in analytical entanglements, arising 
from exercises in arid semanticism, and for that reason to ignore 
pragmatic considerations. Some cases of automatism should as I 
have suggested, involve orders under the equivalent of the Mental 
Health Act, 1959. Others, where recklessness seems to be involved, 
might require some punishment to teach a lesson, since for example, 
a person who knows that he is epileptic and deliberately drives a 
motor vehicle while not complying with an appropriate regime, and 
who suffers an epileptic seizure and causes harm in consequence, 
should be treated as a responsible person and punished to the 
extent necessary to warn him that he must not do so again.105 On 
the other hand, the victim of advanced arteriosclerosis or senile 
dementia could be the subject of a Mental Health Act type of 
order, or if sufficiently deranged, could be found not guilty by 
reason of insanity and detained under section 526 of the Code.
The application of the Mental Health Act type of order to 
alcoholics or drug addicts, could be worked out without too much 
difficulty. Our present treatment of addicts of both classes is gen­
erally unsatisfactory. Many of these persons can and should be 
dealt with outside the criminal process, but the proceedings I 
recommend would be applicable when criminality other than addic­
tion is involved. The court would have to use its discretion in 
determining whether a Mental Health Act type of order was ap­
propriate to the individual case.
One factor to be taken into account would be the increased 
need of diagnostic facilities for the efficient administration of a 
law of this kind. Another would be the necessity for establishment 
of additional outpatient clinics or improved qualification of general
104 See Edwards, Automatism and Social Defence (1965-6), 8 Crim. L.Q. 
258, at pp. 285-9, and Beck, Voluntary Conduct Automatism, Insanity 
and Drunkenness (1966-7), 9 Crim. L.Q. 315.
105 See R. v. Shaw, [1938] O.R. 269; [1938] 3 D.L.R. 140; 70 C.C.C. 159.
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practitioners to administer psychotherapy in society under super­
vision. Finally, it would be necessary to condition our judges and 
magistrates to a rational and somewhat cold-blooded assessment 
of each individual case, free from the emotionalism that often sways 
our sentencers towards excessive severity or excessive leniency.
One objection to my proposal would come from the apostles 
of civil liberties who would point out that the result of a Mental 
Health Act type or order might be that the offender would be in 
custody or under supervision for a longer time than he would be 
if sentences were meted out on the basis of supposed retribution 
or on an assembly line or tariff basis. It is often urged that the 
offender might prefer to spend his time in prison rather than come 
into the hands of a headshrinker.106 Both of these arguments have 
a factual foundation. One of the anomalies of our present sentencing 
policy, if I may use the word policy, is that offenders are often 
sentenced to imprisonment for terms that are far too short having 
regard to the degree of risk they create and the persistence of their 
proclivities. It is true that some forms of criminal conduct cause 
more nuisance than harm and a balance must be struck between 
the protection of society from the nuisance and the interests of 
the offender, which may appear in some cases to require his release 
before any hope of affecting his attitudes or tendencies can be 
entertained. We should, I suggest, completely remove some forms 
of “ nuisance” conduct from the category of crime. On the other 
hand, where criminality occurs, if there is any hope of the success 
of psychotherapy, one term of reasonable length now might be 
balanced against a prospect of a series of future similar offences 
each followed by an inadequate term. We should not allow ourselves 
to be too much influenced by the type of treatment that the offender 
would prefer. Most of us prefer ouselves as we are. We resist change, 
even when it is for our own advantage as well as for that of society. 
We find personality change very painful. Most offenders find it 
more painful than maximum security imprisonment and resist it 
with all their powers just as we do. As long as we exist without 
doing or threatening undue harm to our neighbours, we may 
justifiably refuse to submit to “ brain washing” . When one of us 
poses a threat of unreasonable harm through conduct which is so 
reprehensible that it has been categorized as criminal, society is 
justified in requiring him to submit to procedures designed to change
106 See, e.g. Marriage, in “Review of Crime and Its Treatment in Canada”
(1966), 8 Can. J. of Corrections, 300, at p. 308. I once defended a man 
who refused to allow me to introduce evidence of insanity (which as it 
happened would not have succeeded) because he preferred to risk a long 
penitentiary term rather than to go to “ Penetang”. He got 20 years and 
even that he considered less severe than the other.
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his attitudes and his values and to induce him to seek choices that 
will lead him to relatively harmless decisions. If, as I believe, the 
sole justification for punishment of offenders is to eliminate further 
criminal conduct or at least reduce it to acceptable proportions, I 
think we are justified in appropriate cases in employing psycho­
therapy intended to assist in development of a sense of respons­
ibility, rather than conventional imprisonment, to that end.
